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A War Crimes Tribunal for Sri 
Lanka? Examining the Options 
Under International Law 
Nihal Jayasinghe* & Daley J. Birkett† 
In light of the growing international demands for 
accountability in relation to alleged war crimes committed in Sri 
Lanka during its twenty-six-year armed conflict, this article 
aims to evaluate the options available to both Sri Lanka and the 
international community under the applicable rules of 
international law. First, the background to the armed conflict in 
Sri Lanka will be investigated, with a particular focus on the 
escalation thereof in 2009. This article will then examine the 
options available under public international law to address the 
increasing calls for accountability. Throughout the analysis, 
comparisons will be drawn between the situation in Sri Lanka 
and those in which criminal tribunals have been established to 
prosecute those responsible for perpetrating alleged international 
crimes. By contrasting the options available in relation to the 
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situation in Sri Lanka with analogous situations, conclusions 
will be drawn as to the most viable options through which the 
intensifying demands for accountability might be met under 
international law. 
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I.  Introduction 
At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) 
held in Sri Lanka from November 10 through 17, 2013, leaders aimed 
to discuss global and Commonwealth issues and to decide on 
collective policies and initiatives thereto.1 However, the undeniable 
focus of Western media and human rights groups was set on the war 
crimes allegedly committed in Sri Lanka during the final phase of the 
armed conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), which resulted in a 
conclusive victory for the latter in May 2009.2 Even though—at the 
time of this writing—over five years have passed since the end of the 
Sri Lankan conflict, the demand for an investigation of alleged war 
crimes does not seem to have abated. This article therefore offers an 
 
1. What is CHOGM?, COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, 
http://secretariat.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/180385/ (last visited 
Aug. 12, 2014); What is CHOGM?, CHOGM 2013, 
http://www.chogm2013.lk/index.php/chogm-2013/about-chogm2013/# 
(last visited Aug. 12, 2014). 
2. See James Robbins, Sri Lanka Rights Abuse Allegations Divide 
Commonwealth, BBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24946590; Tom Iggulden, War 
Crimes Allegations Dominate ‘Extraordinary’ CHOGM in Sri Lanka, 
ABC (Nov. 17, 2013), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-17/war-
crime-allegations-dominate-chogm-in-sri-lanka/5097302; Sri Lanka: 
World Must Not Abandon Sri Lanka’s Victims After CHOGM, 
AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 17, 2013), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/sri-
lanka-world-must-not-abandon-sri-lanka-s-victims-after-chogm-2013-11-
17; James Ross, Dispatches: Rights Issues Trump All at CHOGM in Sri 
Lanka, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 17, 2013), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/17/dispatches-rights-issues-trump-
all-chogm-sri-lanka. 
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assessment of the options available to both Sri Lanka and the wider 
international community under international law in order to address 
the growing demands that those responsible for the perpetration of 
alleged war crimes be held to account.3 First, a brief background to 
the armed conflict in Sri Lanka will be provided, followed by an 
examination of the attempts already made by the GoSL, the U.N., 
and non-governmental organizations to meet these intensifying 
demands. 
The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka is a sovereign 
island state situated in the Indian Ocean, having gained its 
independence from the United Kingdom in 1948. Sri Lanka is an 
ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse nation with a 
population of 20.3 million people.4 Of this population, almost 75 
percent are ethnically Sinhalese, speak Sinhala, and 70 percent 
practice Buddhism.5 There is, moreover, a substantial Tamil minority, 
and the Tamil language is consequently spoken widely throughout Sri 
Lanka. Sri Lanka is an independent nation, with an elected legislature 
and executive.6 Indeed, the 2011 Report by the U.N. Secretary-
General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka 
(“Accountability Report”) notes that: “Strong indicators of 
democracy, including universal franchise, a multi-party system and a 
vibrant electoral process, combined with important human 
development achievements, such as high literacy rates both for men 
and women and low infant mortality, contrast sharply with Sri 
Lanka’s long history of war.”7 It is generally agreed that the conflict 
in Sri Lanka grew out of increasingly violent ethnic tensions, and that 
1983 was the starting point of the armed conflict when the GoSL 
responded with armed force in response to LTTE attacks in the 
northern district of Jaffna.8 
 
3. It is emphasized at the outset that the authors neither wish nor intend 
to make any judgment on the occurrence or otherwise of the war crimes, 
which are alleged to have taken place during the Sri Lankan conflict; 
rather, the article aims to present a systematic legal assessment of the 
options available in order to investigate the former. 
4. Country Overview, GOV’T OF SRI LANKA, 
http://www.gov.lk/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=197&Itemid=373&lang=en (last visited Aug. 12, 2014).  
5. Id. 
6. See id. 
7. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General’s Panel of 
Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, ¶ 26 (Mar. 31, 2011), 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pd
f [hereinafter Accountability Report]. 
8. See id. ¶ 30. 
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After 1983, the LTTE became increasingly militarized and—in 
addition to silencing other Tamil groups through violence, thereby 
becoming the self-styled sole representative of the Tamil people—
carried out large-scale suicide attacks against political, economic, 
military, civilian, and religious targets.9 The tactics adopted by the 
LTTE led to its inclusion on the lists of proscribed terrorist 
organizations in the U.S., the United Kingdom, India, Canada, and 
the European Union.10 The LTTE, moreover, exercised control over 
parts of northern and eastern Sri Lanka—sustained by the funding, 
advocacy, and support from its large, uncritical diaspora.11 After the 
collapse of the Ceasefire Agreement signed by both the GoSL and the 
LTTE in 2002,12 and supported by sectors of the international 
community as part of the “global war on terror,” the GoSL resumed 
full-scale hostilities in 2006, leading to its victory over the LTTE in 
the Eastern Province and in some parts of the Northern Province.13 In 
September 2008, the GoSL launched its final military offensive against 
the remaining LTTE forces in the Northern Province, which resulted 
in a decisive victory for the GoSL over the LTTE in May 2009. 
II.  Some Attempts Made Thus Far to Meet the 
Demands for Accountability 
On June 22, 2010, the U.N. Secretary-General appointed the 
Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka (“Panel of Experts”) 
in order “to advise [it] on the issue of accountability with regard to 
alleged violations of international humanitarian and human rights law 
during final stages of armed conflict in Sri Lanka.”14 The Executive 
Summary of the Accountability Report further provides, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
On 22 June 2010, the Secretary-General announced the 
appointment of a Panel of Experts to advise him on the 
implementation of the joint commitment included in the 
statement issued by the President of Sri Lanka and the 
Secretary-General at the conclusion of the Secretary-General’s 
visit to Sri Lanka on 23 March 2009. In the Joint Statement, 
the Secretary-General “underlined the importance of an 
 
9. See id. ¶¶ 31–32. 
10. See id. ¶ 32. 
11. See id. ¶ 33–34. 
12. The full text of which is available at Full text of the Ceasefire 
Agreement, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2002), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/22/srilanka. 
13. See Accountability Report, supra note 7, ¶¶ 45–46. 
14. Id. ¶ 5.  
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accountability process”, and the [GoSL] agreed that it “will take 
measures to address those grievances”. The Panel’s mandate is 
to advise the Secretary-General regarding the modalities, 
applicable international standards and comparative experience 
relevant to an accountability process, having regard to the 
nature and scope of alleged violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law during the final stages of 
the armed conflict in Sri Lanka.15 
In light of the allegations found credible thereby, the Panel of Experts 
recommended, inter alia, that the GoSL, “in compliance with its 
international obligations and with a view to initiating an effective 
domestic accountability process, should immediately commence 
genuine investigations into . . . [the] alleged violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law committed by both sides 
involved in the armed conflict.”16 The Panel of Experts further 
recommended that: 
The Secretary-General should immediately proceed to establish 
an independent international mechanism, whose mandate should 
include the following concurrent functions: (i) Monitor and 
assess the extent to which the [GoSL] is carrying out an 
effective domestic accountability process, including genuine 
investigations of the alleged violations, and periodically advise 
the Secretary-General on its findings; [and] (ii) Conduct 
investigations independently into the alleged violations, having 
regard to genuine and effective domestic investigations . . .17 
Prior to the Accountability Report, the GoSL appointed a 
Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation (LLRC), 
which was mandated “to look back at the conflict Sri Lanka suffered 
as well as to look ahead for an era of healing and peace building in 
the country.”18 The LLRC was more specifically instructed as follows: 
[T]o inquire and report on the following matters that may have 
taken place during the period between 21st February 2002 and 
19th May 2009, namely; 
 
15. Id. at i.  
16. Id. at vii.  
17. Id. 
18. Comm’n of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt & Reconciliation, Report of 
the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation 1 
(2011), available at 
http://www.llrcaction.gov.lk/Downloads/FINALLLRCREPORT.pdf. 
The LLRC was founded under Sri Lankan law, namely Section 2 of the 
Commissions of Inquiry Act (Chapter 393). Id. 
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(i)  the facts and circumstances which led to the failure of the 
ceasefire agreement operationalized on 21st February 2002 
and the sequence of events that followed thereafter up to 
the 19th of May 2009; 
(ii) whether any person, group or institution directly or 
indirectly bear responsibility in this regard; 
(iii) the lessons we would learn from those events and their 
attendant concerns, in order to ensure that there will be no 
recurrence; 
(iv) the methodology whereby restitution to pay persons 
affected by those events or their dependants [sic] or their 
heirs, can be effected; 
(v)  the institutional, administrative and legislative measures 
which need to be taken in order to prevent any recurrence 
of such concerns in the future, and to promote further 
national unity and reconciliation among all communities 
and; to make any such other recommendations with 
reference to any of the matters that have been inquired 
into under the terms of the Warrant.19 
Following its inquiries, the LLRC made a number of recommendations 
in order to promote reconciliation including the establishment of an 
independent institution to address the grievances of Sri Lankan 
citizens affected by state action, the devolution of power by the 
GoSL, better implementation of the state-led language policy, the 
pressing need to standardize access to education, the promotion of 
interfaith activities, linguistic and cultural affinities, and people-to-
people contact, better engagement with the diaspora, and the need to 
establish political consensus among the major political parties and 
between Sinhala and Tamil communities.20 
On March 22, 2012, the U.N. Human Rights Council adopted a 
resolution—the draft of which was first proposed by the  
U.S.21—regarding the promotion of reconciliation and accountability 
in Sri Lanka.22 The text of this resolution provides, in relevant part, 
as follows: 
 
19. Id. at iii–iv. 
20. See id. at 375–88. 
21. Human Rights Council Draft Res. 19/…, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/L.2 
(Mar. 8, 2012). 
22. Human Rights Council Res. 19/2, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 
A/HRC/19/2 (Mar. 22, 2012). See also UN Adopts Resolution on Sri 
Lanka War Crimes Probe, BBC (Mar. 22, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17471300. 
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The Human Rights Council . . . 
1.  Calls upon the [GoSL] to implement the constructive 
recommendations made in the [LLRC report] and to take 
all necessary additional steps to fulfil its relevant legal 
obligations and commitment to initiate credible and 
independent actions to ensure justice, equity, 
accountability and reconciliation for all Sri Lankans; 
2.  Requests the [GoSL] to present, as expeditiously as 
possible, a comprehensive action plan detailing the steps 
that the Government has taken and will take to implement 
the recommendations made in the [LLRC report], and also 
to address alleged violations of international law; 
3.  Encourages the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and relevant special 
procedures mandate holders to provide, in consultation 
with and with the concurrence of the [GoSL], advice and 
technical assistance on implementing the above-mentioned 
steps; and requests the Office of the High Commissioner to 
present a report on the provision of such assistance to the 
Human Rights Council at its twenty-second session.23 
Further, the resolution—although welcoming the recommendations 
made thereby—criticizes the LLRC for failing to “adequately address 
serious allegations of violations of international law.”24 The GoSL was 
the subject of further criticism from the British Government, through 
the Minister with responsibility for Sri Lanka, Alistair Burt, who also 
criticized certain aspects of the LLRC report and called for the GoSL 
to implement its recommendations as soon as practicable.25 These 
reactions clearly demonstrate that the international community 
remains significantly doubtful of GoSL’s commitment to satisfactorily 
probe the foregoing violations of international humanitarian law. 
Non-governmental organizations have similarly sought to meet 
the international demands for accountability. For example, between 
January 14 and 16, 2010, the “People’s Tribunal on  
Sri Lanka”—organized by the Irish Forum for Peace in Sri Lanka and 
conducted by the Permanent People’s Tribunal (PPT) under the 
auspices of the Fondazione Leile Basso Sezione Internazionale—sat in 
 
23. H.R.C. Res. 19/2, supra note 22. 
24. Id. 
25. Foreign Office Minister Responds to Report on the Conflict in Sri 
Lanka, FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (Jan. 12, 2012), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-minister-responds-
to-report-on-the-conflict-in-sri-lanka (noting that the British government 
felt the report left many “gaps and unanswered questions”). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2014  
A War Crimes Tribunal for Sri Lanka? 
574 
the Republic of Ireland.26 PPT is self-styled as “an international 
opinion tribunal, independent from any State authority . . . [which] 
examines cases regarding violations of human rights and the rights of 
peoples.”27 As to this session on Sri Lanka, it is explained that: 
[T]he PPT was first approached by representatives of a broad 
spectrum of NGOs, as early as July 2009. . . . The documents 
supporting the request to convene a session of the PPT with the 
primary objective of focusing on “the last phase of the war, the 
period after the collapse of the peace process, and especially the 
last months” were received and accepted on November 19, 
2009.28 
In light of its examination of the accounts presented thereto, the PPT 
recommended, inter alia, that the GoSL “[e]stablish as a matter of 
urgency an independent and authoritative Truth and Justice 
Commission, to investigate crimes against humanity and war crimes 
committed by parties to the conflict in the course of the last phases of 
the war after the collapse of the 2002 ceasefire, and ensure the 
prosecution of those responsible for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.”29 Indeed, the PPT held a second session on Sri Lanka in 
Bremen, Germany from December 7 to the 10, 2013, following which 
it made additional recommendations to the U.N., the European 
Union, Germany, Sri Lanka, and international organizations and 
agencies.30 
 
26. See PERMANENT PEOPLE’S TRIBUNAL, PEOPLE’S TRIBUNAL ON SRI 
LANKA, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland 7 (Jan. 14-16, 2010) available at 
http://warwithoutwitness.com/images/stories/news/25851626-people-s-
tribunal-on-srilanka-final-report-jan-2010.pdf. 
27. Id. This description, under the heading, “1. The Competence of the 
Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal,” continues, in relevant part, as follows: 
“The importance and strength of decisions by the PPT rest on the 
moral weight of the causes and arguments to which they give credibility, 
as well as the integrity and capability to judge of the Tribunal 
members. Complaints heard by the Tribunal are submitted by the 
victims, or by groups or individuals representing them. The PPT calls 
together all parties concerned and offers the defendants the possibility 
to make their own arguments heard. The Jury is selected for each case 
by combining members who belong to a permanent list of jurors, and 
individuals who are recognized for their competence and integrity.” Id. 
The PPT is not vested with legal authority. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 20. 
30. See PERMANENT PEOPLES’ TRIBUNAL, PEOPLES’ TRIBUNAL ON SRI LANKA, 
Bremen, Germany (Dec. 7-10, 2013), available at 
http://www.internazionaleleliobasso.it/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/Sentenza-Sri-Lanka-and-Tamil-II.pdf. 
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In view of this renewed attention and criticism, it is apposite to 
further discuss the options available under public international law. 
This article will therefore now begin to examine the ways in which the 
growing demands for accountability might be met under the 
applicable rules thereof—including through the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), by unilateral action on the part of the U.N. Security 
Council or General Assembly, by mutual agreement between the U.N. 
and the GoSL, and by independent action on the part of the latter. 
Throughout this legal assessment, the options will be compared with 
similar cases in which tribunals were founded to investigate and try 
those responsible for the commission of alleged international crimes.  
III.  Options Under International Law 
A.  Action by the International Criminal Court 
Sri Lanka is not currently—and has never been—a state party to 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome 
Statute”),31 Article 12(2) of which provides as follows: 
[T]he Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the 
following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3: 
(a)  The State on the territory of which the conduct in 
question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board 
a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel 
or aircraft; 
(b)  The State of which the person accused of the crime is a 
national.32 
In the instant case, the crimes in question were allegedly 
committed on the territory of Sri Lanka by Sri Lankan nationals. In 
light thereof, and given Sri Lanka’s status as a non-signatory to the 
Rome Statute, the ICC has—prima facie—no jurisdiction over the 
crimes allegedly committed in the Sri Lankan conflict. As argued by 
Professor Madeline Morris: 
[There exists a] gap in jurisdiction. If a crime is committed by a 
non-party national on that non-party’s territory, then the ICC 
may not exercise jurisdiction. So, even if the ICC had existed at 
the relevant time, it would not, for example, have been able to  
31. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties
%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Aug. 12, 2014). 
32. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12(2), opened for 
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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exercise jurisdiciton [sic] over the crimes of Pol Pot in 
Cambodia or Kambanda in Rwanda if Cambodia or Rwanda, 
respectively, were non-parties to the [Rome Statute]. In this 
way, the ICC’s effectiveness as an enforcement mechanism is 
significantly limited.33 
To this end, it is argued that the crimes allegedly committed in Sri 
Lanka fall through the same “gap in jurisdiction.” However, the 
possibility remains that the jurisdiction of the ICC could be triggered 
by a resolution of the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
U.N. Charter.34 To this end, Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute 
provides as follows: 
The ICC may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime 
referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this 
Statute if: 
(b)  A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to 
have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the 
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations.35 
The Security Council has utilized this power on only two occasions 
since the Rome Statute came into force: in the situation in Darfur, 
Sudan;36 and in the situation in Libya.37 Consequently, the ICC  
 
33. Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-
Party States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 14 n.3 (2001). See also 
Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction over Non-Signatory 
Nationals, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 1–2 (2000); Dapo Akande, The 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-
Parties: Legal Basis and Limits, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 618, 618–19 
(2003); Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction over the Nationals of 
Non-Party States: A Critique of the US Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 67, 69 (2001). 
34. U.N. Charter, ch. VII. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 168–69 (4th ed. 
2011) (describing the process of Security Council referrals to the ICC); 
Luigi Condorelli & Santiago Villalpando, Referral and Deferral by the 
Security Council, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 627–54 (Antonio Cassese, Paola 
Gaeta, & John R. W. D. Jones eds., 2002); Sharon Williams & William 
Schabas, Article 12, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY 
ARTICLE 569–74 (2d ed. 2008). 
35. Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 13(b). 
36. See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). Sudan—like 
Sri Lanka—is not a state party to the Rome Statute. This referral led to 
the issuance of five warrants of arrest, including that of President Omar 
al-Bashir. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. 
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may—albeit in limited circumstances—exercise jurisdiction over 
crimes committed on the territory of non-states parties to the Rome 
Statute and by nationals of non-signatory states.38 However, the 
Security Council failed to reach consensus as to binding measures at 
the time the Sri Lankan conflict escalated.39 Indeed, the only action 
taken by the Security Council at that stage was the release of a press 
statement,40 the text of which expressed, inter alia, grave concern at 
the worsening humanitarian situation in Sri Lanka, acknowledged the 
genuine right of the GoSL to combat terrorism, and demanded that 
all parties adhere to their obligations under international 
humanitarian law.41 Because one or more of the five permanent 
members of the Security council opposed such binding measures,42 the 
Chapter VII option to create ICC jurisdiction was not activated. 
 
ICC-02/05-01/09, Request for Arrest and Surrender (July 7, 2014), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1800331.pdf. 
37. See S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). This 
referral led to the issuance of three arrest warrants. See Press Release, 
Security Council, Chief Prosecutor of International Criminal Court Tells 
Security Council He Will Seek Arrest Warrants Soon Against Three 
Individuals in First Libya Case, U.N. Press Release SC/10241 (May 4, 
2011). Libya—like Sudan and Sri Lanka—is not a state party to the 
Rome Statute. 
38. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 33, at 14 n.3.  
39. It has been argued that Russo-Chinese opposition to any action against 
the GoSL security forces in Sri Lanka has prevented consensus in the 
Security Council. See, e.g., Russia China ‘Support Sri Lanka,’ BBC 
SINHALA (June 18, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2011/06/110618_lanka_chin
a_russia.shtml. If this view is accepted, it is not illogical to suggest that 
a binding measure by the Security Council on the Sri Lankan issue 
seems unlikely. 
40. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Sri 
Lanka, U.N. Press Release SC/9659 (May 13, 2009). 
41. Id. 
42. Indeed, China has publicly expressed support for the way in which the 
GoSL has acted in response to the growing demands for accountability 
in relation to alleged war crimes: “Sri Lanka has set up relevant 
institution to look into civil war-related issues. China believes that the 
[GoSL] and [the] people of Sri Lanka are capable of handling all relevant 
issues. We hope the international community can support and 
coordinate the endeavor of the [GoSL], create a favorable external 
environment for the [GoSL]’s efforts to stabilize domestic situation and 
accelerate economic development, and refrain from taking any measure 
to complicate the issue.” Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s 
Remarks on the Report of the UN Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts 
on Sri Lanka, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t819905.htm. 
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Consequently, because Sri Lanka is also not a state party to the 
Rome Statute, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over the crimes 
allegedly committed by Sri Lankan nationals during the armed 
conflict.  
Notwithstanding, it is noted that the GoSL may elect to lodge a 
declaration with the Registrar under Article 12(3) of the Rome 
Statute, accepting jurisdiction of the ICC on an ad hoc basis over a 
particular situation or certain crimes. Pursuant to Article 12(3), if a 
non-state party accepts the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC by making 
such a declaration, the foregoing jurisdictional gap is filled; in other 
words, this gap is only relevant as regards non-states parties that are 
unwilling to make such a declaration.43 Although it appears unlikely 
that the GoSL will shortly lodge a declaration, it is nonetheless 
noteworthy that there exists a statutory mechanism for non-states 
parties to consent to the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC, which has 
been utilized to date by Côte d’Ivoire,44 the Palestinian National 
Authority,45 and Ukraine.46 
B.  Action by the U.N.: An Ad Hoc Tribunal for Sri Lanka? 
The Security Council is, however, further empowered to act under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, Article 39 of which provides as 
follows: 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall 
 
43. Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute provides as follows: “If the acceptance 
of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under 
paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, 
accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime 
in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without 
any delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.” See also Prosecutor 
v. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11 OA 2, 
Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo Against the 
Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I on Jurisdiction and Stay of the 
Proceedings, ¶¶ 72–84 (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1526463.pdf (noting the example of Côte 
d’Ivoire, which is not a party to the Rome Statute, but was nonetheless 
subject to ICC jurisdiction pursuant to an Article 12(3) declaration). 
44. See Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11 OA 2, ¶ 75. 
45. See Victor Kattan, Palestine and the International Criminal Court, 
EURO. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 1, 2014), 
http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_palestine_and_the_in
ternational_criminal_court303. 
46. Ukraine Accepts ICC Jurisdiction over Alleged Crimes Committed 
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make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken 
in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
It was pursuant to this legal basis that the Security Council 
established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia—in Resolution 827 (1993)47—and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda—in Resolution 955 (1994).48 However, 
it must be noted that the formation of these two ad hoc criminal 
tribunals was only possible owing to the non-opposition of all five 
permanent members of the Security Council. Accordingly, without 
consensus, the U.N. Security Council is unable to pass a binding 
measure regarding the crimes allegedly committed during the armed 
conflict in Sri Lanka. It is consequently suggested that a more viable 
alternative might be a mechanism established by an international 
agreement between the U.N. and the GoSL, similar to that which 
occurred in Cambodia. 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) 
was established jointly by the 2001 Law on the Establishment of 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, as amended in 2004,49 and the 2004 Agreement Between 
the U.N. and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the 
Period of Democratic Kampuchea.50 The ECCC resulted from a ten-
year negotiation process between the Royal Government of Cambodia 
and the U.N. and is sui generis insofar as, inter alia, it forms a 
separate court structure, but is still housed within the Cambodian 
legal system, staffed by both Cambodian and international judges, 
lawyers, and other personnel.51 The ECCC is able to exercise subject-
 
47. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
48. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
49. Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period 
of Democratic Kampuchea, amended Oct. 27, 2004 
(NS/RKM/1004/006), available at 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-
documents/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf. 
50. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government 
of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of 
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, June 
6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 1, available at 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-
documents/Agreement_between_UN_and_RGC.pdf. 
51. For a comprehensive overview of the history and structure of the 
ECCC, see David Scheffer, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
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matter jurisdiction over violations of international conventions as 
specified in its constitutive instruments, as well as certain crimes 
under the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code. In this way, the ECCC may 
be viewed as a domestic court supported by international staff. 
It is clear from the Cambodian experience that the U.N. General 
Assembly—in addition to the Security Council—is able to play a role 
in the establishment of an accountability mechanism, such as a 
criminal tribunal.52 However, the legally binding effect of U.N. General 
Assembly resolutions is disputed.53 Indeed, pursuant to the doctrine 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, it can be argued that, because 
Article 25 of the U.N. Charter expressly provides that member states 
are obligated to carry out Security Council resolutions, the absence of 
an equivalent power attributed to General Assembly resolutions 
renders the latter not legally binding. Thus, General Assembly 
resolutions a fortiori contain no legal obligation for member states, 
unlike those of the Security Council. An analysis of the U.N. Charter 
and the travaux préparatoires thereof demonstrate further that such a 
competence is ascribed to the Security Council, but not to the 
General Assembly.54 Accordingly, if it is correct that as “a general rule 
of modern international institutional law, it has been accepted that 
international organizations cannot take binding external decisions 
unless their constitutions expressly so provide,”55 the General 
 
of Cambodia, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 219–56 (M. Cherif 
Bassiouni ed., 2008).  
52. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 57/228, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/228 (Dec. 18, 
2002), in which the General Assembly requested, inter alia, the 
Secretary-General to resume negotiations to conclude an agreement with 
the Government of Cambodia and made recommendations as regards 
the subject-matter and personal jurisdiction of the ECCC. 
53. For the ‘moral’ and ‘political’ effects of General Assembly Resolutions, 
see, for example, D. H. N. Johnson, The Effect of Resolutions of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 97 
(1956). See also HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 770, 935 (5th ed. 2011); F. Blaine 
Sloan, The Binding Force of a ‘Recommendation’ of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 29 (1948); 
Richard A. Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General 
Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 783 (1966). 
54. See Falk, supra note 51, at 783 (stating that for example, at the United 
Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, the 
delegation of the Philippines proposed that “The General Assembly 
should be vested with the legislative authority to enact rules of 
international law which should become effective and binding upon the 
members of the Organization after such rules have been approved by a 
majority vote of the Security Council;” however, this proposal was 
rejected by twenty-six votes to one). 
55. See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 51, at 825. 
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Assembly is able to initiate an accountability mechanism in the 
instant case only with the agreement of the GoSL. However, on the 
other hand, if the mechanism were to be triggered by the Security 
Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, Sri Lanka—as 
a member state thereof—is obliged to accept and carry out the 
decision under Article 25 of the Charter.56 
Indeed, it was under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter that the 
Security Council established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL).57 The establishment of the STL is particularly illustrative in 
demonstrating that, if an accountability process is initiated by a state 
requesting assistance from the U.N., it might be concluded without 
the necessary constitutional measures having been fulfilled in the state 
concerned. The foundation of the STL stems from, inter alia, a 
request by the Government of Lebanon that the U.N. create a 
criminal tribunal of international character to try those responsible 
for terrorist bombings as well as other attacks in Lebanon since 
October 2004.58 An agreement to establish such a tribunal was drafted 
but never ratified by the Lebanese Parliament.59 The Security Council 
consequently made use of its powers under Chapter VII, thereby 
creating the STL, despite the ultimate failure by the state to sign the 
constitutive instrument thereof.60 In the instant case, however, in 
order to establish a similar tribunal for Sri Lanka, it would require 
that either (i) the GoSL consent to the creation thereof or (ii) the 
Security Council reach consensus as to binding measures thereto. 
Due to the limitations of the foregoing international options and 
the Security Council’s inability to reach a consensus regarding a 
tribunal for Sri Lanka, the GoSL may consider adopting a similar 
approach to the one Bangladesh took in response to the alleged crimes 
committed during its Liberation War. Bangladesh equally suffered as 
a result of alleged international crimes, but decided to create a 
tribunal that was arguably more aligned with the principle of national 
sovereignty. The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) is a 
Bangladeshi domestic court with no direct involvement of the U.N. or 
any other state. The ICT is described as “a war crimes tribunal in 
 
56. See U.N. Charter art. 25. 
57. See S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007). 
58. the STL, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, http://www.stl-
tsl.org/en/about-the-stl/creation-of-the-stl (last modified Dec. 24, 2012); 
Frédéric Mégret, A Special Tribunal for Lebanon: The UN Security 
Council and the Emancipation of International Criminal Justice, 21 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 485 (2008). 
59. See Creation of the STL, supra note 56; see also Mégret, supra note 56, 
at 492. 
60. See Creation of the STL, supra note 56; see also Mégret, supra note 56, 
at 492. 
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Bangladesh set up in 2009 to investigate and prosecute suspects for 
the atrocities committed in 1971 . . . during the Bangladesh 
Liberation War.”61 In addition to the narrow options available under 
public international law, internationalized tribunals have faced 
growing criticism. Indeed, according to Ambassador Stephen Rapp, 
“we are at the end of the era of ad hoc international tribunals.”62 It is 
thus arguably more appropriate in the present circumstances to adopt 
a similar domestic approach in Sri Lanka. 
C. The Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes 
Although the ICC potentially has universal jurisdiction, this 
concept may have broader implications for the prosecution of the 
alleged war crimes committed during the conflict in Sri Lanka. 
Universal jurisdiction is, however, not subject to a universally agreed 
definition.63 Nonetheless, the following definition adopted by the 
Institute of International Law at its 2005 Session in Krakow is 
sufficient for the purposes of the present article: 
Universal jurisdiction in criminal matters . . . means the 
competence of a State to prosecute alleged offenders and to 
punish them if convicted, irrespective of the place of commission 
of the crime and regardless of any link of active or passive 
nationality, or other grounds of jurisdiction recognized by 
international law.64 
 
61. International Crimes Tribunal (Bangladesh), MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS BANGL., 
http://www.mofa.gov.bd/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=692&Itemid=177 (last visited Aug. 12, 2014). 
62. Stephen J. Rapp, The Reach and the Grasp of International Criminal 
Justice—How Do We Lengthen the Arm of the Law?, 45 CASE W. RES. 
J. INT’L L. 651, 655 (2013). 
63. For example, Dr. Roger O’Keefe adopts the following negative 
definition: “universal jurisdiction amounts to the assertion of jurisdiction 
to prescribe in the absence of any other accepted jurisdictional nexus at 
the time of the relevant conduct.” Roger O’Keefe, Universal 
Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 735, 
745 (2004) (emphasis added). See generally Georges Abi-Saab, The 
Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 596 (2003); 
Antonio Cassese, Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a 
Sensible Notion of Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 589 (2003); 
Olympia Bekou & Robert Cryer, The International Criminal Court and 
Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 49 
(2007); George P. Fletcher, Against Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 580 (2003); Claus Kreß, Universal Jurisdiction over 
International Crimes and the Institut de Droit International, 4 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 561 (2006). 
64. Instit. of Int’l Law, Universal Criminal Jurisdiction with Regard to the 
Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, Krakow 
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It is, however, widely accepted that universal jurisdiction applies to 
certain crimes—including piracy, genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes—because it is argued that every state has a legitimate 
interest in the suppression of these serious crimes.65 A notable 
example of universal jurisdiction—and specifically relevant to the 
instant situation in Sri Lanka—is the number of arrest warrants that 
have been issued against Israeli representatives for crimes allegedly 
committed in Gaza in response to rocket attacks emanating 
therefrom. These warrants were issued without any territorial link, 
any link of active or passive nationality, or other grounds of 
jurisdiction under the applicable rules of international law. Indeed, 
the United Kingdom has made several attempts to exercise universal 
jurisdiction against former Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni,66 
Major General Doron Almog—the former Head of the Israel Defense 
Forces (IDF) Southern Command,67 Defense Minister Ehud Barak,68 
and the former IDF Chief of Staff, Moshe Ya’alon.69 Similar such 
attempts to exercise this form of jurisdiction have been made in the 
Netherlands against former Head of the Shin Bet—Israel’s internal 
security service—Ami Ayalon70 and in Spain against former Defense 
 
Sess. Res., 17th Comm’n, ¶ 1 (Aug. 26, 2005), available at 
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005_kra_03_en.pdf. 
65. See, e.g., Julia Geneuss, Fostering a Better Understanding of Universal 
Jurisdiction: A Comment on the AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle 
of Universal Jurisdiction, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 945, 952 (2009). See 
also Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 14 
(February 14); O’Keefe, supra note 61, at 757. 
66. See, e.g., Israel Fury at UK Attempt to Arrest Tzipi Livni, BBC (Dec. 
15, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8413234.stm. 
67. See, e.g., Israel Fury at UK Attempt to Arrest Tzipi Livni, BBC (Dec. 
15, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8413234.stm. 
68. See Ian Black & Ian Cobain, Israeli Minister Ehud Barak Faces War 
Crimes Arrest Threat During UK Visit, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 
2009), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/29/ehud-barak-
war-crimes-israel; Lawyers Seek Arrest of Israeli Defence Minister in 
UK for Alleged War Crimes, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2009), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/29/ehud-barak-warrant-
war-crimes-gaza. 
69. See, e.g., Israel Minister Feared UK Arrest, BBC (Oct. 5, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8290554.stm. 
70. In this case, an arrest warrant was sought based on allegations of 
torture. See Vervolging ex-hoofd Shin Bet, DE TELEGRAAF 
(NETHERLANDS) (Aug. 19, 2009), 
http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/article20492744.ece. The court, 
however, found that it had no jurisdiction. See Geen vervolging ex-hoofd 
Shin Bet, DE TELEGRAAF (NETHERLANDS), (Oct. 27, 2009), 
http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/20512624/__geen_vervolging_ex-
hoofd_shin_bet__.html. 
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Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer and six other military officers under 
his command, including Major General Almog and Moshe Ya’alon.71 
Despite these numerous attempts, however, the authors note that the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction is not yet governed by an 
international agreement and is therefore devoid of a well-structured, 
coherent body of law.72 Nonetheless, regardless of this absence, the 
possibility that a domestic court outside Sri Lanka might try to 
exercise this form of jurisdiction cannot be discounted. Indeed, Sri 
Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s visit to the United Kingdom 
in 2010 prompted lawyers on behalf of Tamil activists to seek a 
warrant for his arrest—under the head of universal jurisdiction—for 
the alleged commission of war crimes during the Sri Lankan conflict.73 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
Thus far, the U.N. Secretary-General has not opted to institute 
an independent international accountability mechanism—as 
recommended by the Panel of Experts—without the consent of the 
GoSL or action by other member states.74 It has also been established 
 
71. See, e.g., Manuel Altozano, La Audiencia Investigará A Un Ex Ministro 
Israelí Por Un Bombardeo En Gaza en 2002, EL PAÍS (Jan. 29, 2009), 
http://elpais.com/elpais/2009/01/29/actualidad/1233220623_850215.ht
ml. In this case, the Spanish prosecutor chose not to proceed with the 
investigation, having been assured that Israeli jurisdiction prevailed. See 
José Yoldi, La Audiencia No Investigará el Ataque de Israel a Gaza, EL 
PAÍS (SPAIN) (Jun. 30, 2009), 
http://elpais.com/elpais/2009/06/30/actualidad/1246349822_850215.ht
ml. 
72. See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 61, at 595 (stating that a treaty 
delineating the use and limits of universal jurisdiction would reduce 
uncertainties of customary international law, but that creation of such a 
treaty would be time-intensive, and thus application of universal 
jurisdiction is left to regular construction of customary international 
law). 
73. See Owen Bowcott & Sam Jones, War Crimes Lawyers Seek Arrest of 
Sri Lankan President in Oxford, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2010), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/sri-lanka-president-
arrest-war-crimes. It is noted that the law in England and Wales has 
since changed so that the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
is required before an arrest warrant is issued in universal jurisdiction 
cases brought by individuals. See Press Release: Universal Jurisdiction, 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (Sept. 15, 2011), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/universal-jurisdiction. 
74. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General’s 
Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka, ¶ 182 
(Nov. 2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review
_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf (“In the absence of both a mandate 
and a Government’s consent—as is likely to be the case of Sri Lanka—
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that action by the U.N. Security Council is unlikely in light of the 
lack of consensus therein. Moreover, this article establishes that the 
General Assembly is similarly unable to act without the consent of 
the GoSL. Accordingly, the onus rests on the GoSL to satisfactorily 
meet the increasing demands for accountability in relation to the 
alleged war crimes committed in Sri Lanka during the conflict 
between the LTTE and the former. It is argued that the GoSL ought 
not to shy away from the demand for a state-led accountability 
mechanism because such an exercise would negate the requirement for 
the establishment of an international criminal tribunal, thereby 
avoiding the criticisms with which such mechanisms are continually 
faced. This course of action would, moreover, reduce the likelihood 
that a domestic court outside Sri Lanka would choose to exercise 
universal jurisdiction over the alleged war crimes, which would raise 
the additional problem of discerning a coherent body of applicable 
law. It is the view of the present authors that any domestic inquiry 
must be both credible and independent. If not, there is a concrete risk 
that it might be considered as an attempt by the current regime to 
escape justice and that it might consequently be discarded as such. 
It is pleasing to note that the GoSL has launched an action plan 
for the implementation of LLRC recommendations.75 Indeed, the 
GoSL action plan has consolidated the recommendations under five 
headings: International Humanitarian Law Issues; Human Rights; 
Land Return and Resettlement; Restitution/Compensatory Relief; 
and Reconciliation.76 Under the auspices of the GoSL plan of action, 
inter alia, a commission was formed with the mandate to investigate 
alleged abductions or disappearances of persons resident in the Sri 
Lankan Northern and Eastern Provinces during the period from 1990 
to 2009.77 The present authors hope that the GoSL will continue to 
 
the establishment of a Commission of inquiry to conduct investigations 
in its territory is virtually impossible. The option of conducting an 
investigation outside the territory of Sri Lanka is, of course, possible (as 
was the case in a number of occasions in the past), but if it is, it is 
likely to replicate the experience of the present [Panel of Experts] with 
little added value.”); see also Accountability Report, supra note 7, ¶ 
444. 
75. See NATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LLRC 
RECOMMENDATIONS, http://www.llrcaction.gov.lk/ (last visited Aug. 12, 
2014). 
76. Id. 
77. See Presidential Commission to Investigate Alleged Disappearances, 
MINISTRY OF DEF. SRI LANKA, 
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Presidential_commission_to_in
vestigate_alleged_disappearances_20140117_05 (last modified Jan. 17, 
2014). The present authors note that the Commission held its first 
public sittings between January 18 and 21, 2014. See also Rasika 
Somarathna, Commission to Investigate into Complaints Regarding 
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put into effect the recommendations by the LLRC, which can be 
quickly implemented, and that others, which are not yet practicable, 
will be realized in due course. It is noted that on February 1, 2014, 
the U.S. Department of State— through Assistant Secretary for South 
and Central Asia, Nisha Desai Biswal—confirmed that the U.S. is not 
entertaining the possibility of economic sanctions against Sri Lanka 
“at this point.”78 It is the view of the present authors that if the GoSL 
remains indifferent to the views of the international community, Sri 
Lanka may face an international investigation without the consent 
and participation of the former in addition to such measures. In order 
to prevent further instability thereby, it is consequently emphasized 
that there is a pressing need for the GoSL to establish an appropriate 
accountability mechanism in relation to alleged war crimes committed 
during the armed conflict in Sri Lanka. 
Although the U.S. cannot be said to speak on behalf of the entire 
international community,79 recent statements delivered thereby 
suggest that there is growing impatience at the international level 
over the pace at which the GoSL is implementing the 
recommendations of the LLRC.80 To this end, the U.S. sponsored a 
third resolution when the U.N. Human Rights Council reconvened in 
March 2014, calling for, inter alia, the establishment of a Sri Lankan-
led reconciliation and accountability process.81 In light thereof, it is 
evident that at least part of the wider international community would 
prefer a process initiated by the GoSL; however, should the latter 
choose not to take positive action, it is equally clear that further 
measures might be considered by third party states in order to put an 
accountability mechanism into effect. It is the hope of the present 
 
Missing Persons: Compensation to Next of Kin, DAILY NEWS, 
http://www.dailynews.lk/?q=features/compensation-next-kin (last 
visited Aug. 12, 2014) (noting that thus far, the Commission has 
received approximately 16,000 complaints). 
78. Press Conference with Assistant Secretary Nisha Biswal in Colombo, Sri 
Lanka, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 1, 2014), 
http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2014/221143.htm. 
79. See, e.g., Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Remarks, supra 
note 42. 
80. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron, 
emphasized that a state-led investigation must be completed by March 
2014, lest his government press for an international process. See 
Cameron Calls for War Crimes Inquiry in Sri Lanka, BBC (Nov. 16, 
2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24967501. 
81. See Human Rights Council Adopts a Resolution on Reconciliation, 
Accountability and Human Rights in Sri Lanka, HUMAN RIGHTS 
COUNCIL (Mar. 27, 2014), 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsI
D=14447&LangID=E. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2014  
A War Crimes Tribunal for Sri Lanka? 
587 
authors that this article will stimulate further discussion on the issues 
raised herein. It is noted that, in March 2014, the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay made public her written 
report based on her week-long visit to Sri Lanka in August 2013.82 It 
is hoped that this report, alongside the aforementioned meeting of the 
U.N. Human Rights Council, will significantly contribute towards the 
realization of credible justice, accountability, and a reconciliation 
process in Sri Lanka. 
 
82. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Promoting Reconciliation and 
Accountability in Sri Lanka, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/23 (Feb. 24, 2014). 
